

Example: chess



 $Players = \{white, black\}$

State s: (position of all pieces, whose turn it is)

Actions(s): legal chess moves that Player(s) can make

 $\mathsf{IsEnd}(s)$: whether s is checkmate or draw

Utility(s): $+\infty$ if white wins, 0 if draw, $-\infty$ if black wins

Characteristics of games

• All the utility is at the end state



• Different players in control at different states



The halving game

Problem: halving game-

Start with a number N.

Players take turns either decrementing N or replacing it with $\lfloor \frac{N}{2} \rfloor$. The player that is left with 0 wins.

[semi-live solution: HalvingGame]

10

- Chess is a canonical example of a two-player zero-sum game. In chess, the state must represent the position of all pieces, and importantly, whose turn it is (white or black). Here, we are assuming that white is the agent and black is the opponent. White moves first and is trying to maximize the utility, whereas black is trying to minimize the utility.
- In most games that we'll consider, the utility is degenerate in that it will be $+\infty$, $-\infty$, or 0.

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There are two important characteristics of games which make them hand.
The first is that the utility is only at the end state. In hypical search problems and MDPs that we might encounter, there are costs and rewards associated with each edge. These intermediate quantities make the problem easier to solve. In games, even if there are cues that indicate how well one is doing (number of pieces, score), technically all that matters is what happens at the end. In chess, it doesn't matter how many pieces you capture, your goal is just to checkmate the opponent's king.
The second is the recognition that there are other people in the world! In search problems, you (the agent) controlled all actions. In MDPs, we already hinted at the loss of control where nature controlled the chance nodes, but we assumed we knew what distribution nature was using to transition. Now, we have another player that controls certain states, who is probably out to get us.

Policies

Deterministic policies: $\pi_p(s) \in Actions(s)$

action that player \boldsymbol{p} takes in state \boldsymbol{s}

Stochastic policies $\pi_p(s, a) \in [0, 1]$:

probability of player \boldsymbol{p} taking action \boldsymbol{a} in state \boldsymbol{s}

[semi-live solution: humanPolicy]

12

CS221

- Following our presentation of MDPs, we revisit the notion of a **policy**. Instead of having a single policy π_v we have a policy π_p for each player $p \in$ Players. We require that π_p only be defined when it's p's turn; that is, for states s such that Player(s) = p. It will be convenient to allow policies to be stochastic. In this case, we will use $\pi_p(s, a)$ to denote the probability of player p choosing action a instance of the probability of player p choosing action p.
- It will be convenient to allow pointers to be such that, in the case, we will use $a_p(s, a)$ to convert the problem of party p -income such that in a fast s. We can think of an MDP as a game between the agent and nature. The states of the game are all MDP states s and all chance nodes (s, a). It's the agent's turn on the MDP states, and the agent acts according to regard. It's nature's turn on the chance nodes. Here, the actions are successor states s', and nature chooses s' with probability given by the transition probabilities of the MDP: $\pi_{nature}((s, a), s') = T(s, a, s')$.